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ABSTRACT
The objective of our paper is to provide the reason why headquarters 
voluntarily transfer its bargaining power to the business unit by stylizing 
an incomplete contract model. Our model shows that the equilibrium 
bargaining power selected by the headquarters is negatively correlated with 
the importance attached to the business unit’s operations. It means that when 
incomplete contracts severely restrict an important business unit’s incentive 
to invest because of holdup problem, the headquarters should necessarily 
provide the business unit with some degree of bargaining power. This 
result is consistent with the fact that the independence of a business unit 
(e.g., spin-offs) is a commonly observable practice. Building on our model, 
independence of the business unit can be interpreted as a consequence of a 
gradual delegation of authority by the headquarters. Our paper contributes 
to both of economics and management accounting literature by providing 
a model concerning to a decision of organizational structure.
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INTRODUCTION
A business unit, which is one fragment of a company, is commonly observed 
to grow into a specific operating division or even a wholly owned subsidiary, 
finally becoming an independent company. We examine explanations of 
why a business unit gradually acquires more independence from its parent 
company. Several classical studies regarding the boundaries of firms 
constitute the “transaction cost theory” (e.g., Coase, 1937; Williamson, 
1985). The transaction cost theory argues that the boundary of the firm is 
designed to minimize transaction costs. Other studies such as Grossman 
and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) approach the boundary aspect 
from the context of incomplete contracts. They suggest that the boundary 
of a firm is set by preliminarily considering how to appropriately allocate 
the residual control in order to resolve the prevalent holdup problem. These 
studies consider the distribution problem inside a company given that 
bargaining power is exogenously endowed to constituents of the company.
Our study extends previous research and focuses on the phenomenon 
that the company headquarters voluntarily reduces its own bargaining 
power. We investigate the theoretical background as to why the company 
headquarters, albeit entitled with significant bargaining power, accepts 
the reduction in the share of total profit. In doing so, we seek the optimal 
bargaining power that is relinquished from the headquarters to the business 
unit. This approach has not been adopted by prior studies.
We present a stylized model in which the headquarters can acquire 
more profit by transferring some portion of its bargaining power to the 
important business unit, which generates greater added value in its value 
chain. The result is not contradictory because, as the role played by the 
business unit becomes more important, it is increasingly beneficial to provide 
the business unit with an incentive to invest more in its own operations. 
As long as additional profit generated from marginal investments by the 
business unit compensates for the loss incurred by the headquarters by losing 
a fraction of its bargaining power, the headquarters will readily choose to 
cede its bargaining power.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Section 2 
discusses prior research. Section 3 develops a simple model to depict the 
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bargaining game and the propositions drawn from the model and compares 
these with the pure Nash bargaining solution. Section 4 shows numerical 
examples by altering the level of the production cost parameter. Section 
5 includes discussion about the results of our analysis. Finally, Section 6 
concludes. 
LITERATURE REVIEW
Some studies do not determine the bargaining power per se but rather 
consider the distribution problem inside a company given the bargaining 
power exogenously endowed to constituents of the company (e.g., manager 
and employees). Aoki (1988) formulates the distribution of payoffs between 
these constituents by solving the Nash product maximization and concludes 
that bargaining leads to the appropriate distributive share assigned to each 
player. In accordance with Aoki’s (1988) model, Sasaki, Yonezawa, and 
Azeez (2008) empirically demonstrate that the conflicts of interest and 
the distribution problem between a manager and employees result in a 
significant deterioration of shareholder value. In a context of a principal-
agent relationship facing adverse selection, Inderst (2002) proposes a 
model in which the principal can reduce information rent, thereby removing 
distortion of the contract by ceding bargaining power to the agent, while 
bargaining power is not the variable of direct interest but an exogenously 
given condition. In contrast, our study contributes to the literature by 
considering the setting where players decide the level of their bargaining 
power in the profit maximization process.
However, several studies focus on bargaining power determined 
strategically and endogenously. Ishida and Matsushima (2009) analyze the 
manner with which the labor union decides its rent-seeking activity level to 
enhance its bargaining power against the company. Similarly, Levy (1998) 
addresses union dues as an endogenous variable, while the level of union 
dues exhibits tradeoffs between the strength of union members’ connection 
and the rate of participation in the union. Guo et al. (2018) argue that in 
a supply chain, suppliers that dominate the game hold all the bargaining 
power. In contrast, when retailers are the decision-makers, they attempt to 
retain the bargaining power level, which allows the suppliers to participate 
in the contract. We employ a different approach to this bargaining game 
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by focusing on why the downstream player (i.e., headquarters) abandons 
some of its bargaining power to the upstream player (i.e., business unit).
In addition, empirical scholars have attempted to clarify the antecedents 
of spin-offs. Iturriaga and Cruz (2008) used 166 spin-off cases of Spanish 
companies and identified three reasons. Panela et al. (2019) examined 
accounting and financial antecedents of spin-offs in the lodging industry. 
They found that six accounting and financial factors influence company’s 
decision of spin-offs. The central findings drawn from our theoretical model 
have implications for this line of empirical research as well.
MODEL DEVELOPMENT
We consider a perfectly competitive market with two risk-neutral players—
headquarters and business unit—denoted by H and U, respectively. Before 
production, U decides to produce x units of goods, and H must purchase all 
of the goods provided by U. To simplify, let the sales price be fixed at unity. 
Such a market price enables H to sell all the goods to consumers. Because 
H cannot control all the manufacturing processes of U due to its inherent 
assets, including human resources, it is necessary for H to delegate to U 
the decision rights regarding manufacturing capacity.
We further assume that H can determine the bargaining power 
allocation after observing the cost structure of U so that H can achieve 
the maximum profit. This assumption is consistent with the case of spin-
offs where H is supposed to abandon some of its bargaining power as the 
size of production grows.1 In this article, we define bargaining power as 
H’s contractible share of U’s revenue that will be realized from the sale 
of goods. When the size of U is relatively small, H generally possesses a 
large fraction of the revenue. In this case, U has little incentive to invest. 
However, once U becomes an operating division, H may allow U to invest 
some fraction of sales revenue in its own business or to increase the wage 
of employees involved in the division. This possibility implies a somewhat 
decreased bargaining power of H. Moreover, when U grows into a subsidiary, 
1 For example, regarding the extended bargaining power by H, consider the case in which a new drug 
or internet venture becomes an affiliate of an extant major company. The fact that U voluntarily 
abandons its bargaining power is similar to our assumption that H can determine the bargaining 
power ex post.
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H’s access to U’s revenue is restricted to only a formal distribution of the 
outcome proportionate to its equity share. Our model explores the bargaining 
game between H and U, which explicitly considers the condition where H 
cedes bargaining power to maximize profit.
The game is assumed to have the following timeline. (1) The cost 
structure of U is determined, which is characterized by a nonnegative 
marginal cost parameter β. This parameter is known to both players. (2) H 
chooses the optimal bargaining power level t, where 0 ≤ t ≤ 1. (3) U then 
selects the production volume x ≥ 0, given the bargaining power t and the 
cost structure β. After x units are produced and sold, profits of H and U 
are realized. The profits of H and U, denoted πH and πU, respectively, are 
therefore obtained as follows:
πH (t,	β,	x) = t{(1+β) x – x2} (1)
and
πU (t,	β,	x) = (1-t) {(1+β) x – x
2} – βx (2)
The terms inside the curly brackets denote the total revenue from 
production that is allocated according to each player’s bargaining power t. 
Because we consider a perfectly competitive market, the terms inside the 
curly brackets is concave and increasing in x. This setting about revenue 
is same as Guo et al. (2018) assumed. Equation (2) indicates that U is a 
residual claimant and solely responsible for the irreversible investment (i.e., 
βx). Accordingly, an increase in such investment βx, which in turn affects 
the profit of H, can be interpreted as the incremental importance attributed 
to U’s project.
First, we consider the optimal production volume x if the company 
attempts to maximize total profit, which means that U has no bargaining 
power. In this case, the company selects the production volume to maximize 
profit, as follows:
π(t=1, β, x) = πH (t = 1, β	,	x) + πU (t = 1, β,	x)  = x – x2 (3)
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It is easily shown that , and it does not depend on the marginal cost 
β. Note that equation (3) is identical to the total profit when any decision 
concerning production level is completely under the control of H (i.e., t = 1).
Next, we address the case of incomplete contracts, in which we assume 
that the production volume choice is wholly dependent on U. Given the 
known marginal cost β and selected bargaining power t, the first-order 
condition in equation (2) yields U’s optimal production level as a function 
of these parameters:
Asia-Pacific Management Accounting Journal, Volume 14 Issue 2 
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Applying backward induction, H anticipates the response of U 
expressed in equation (4) and chooses the optimal bargaining power. The 
profit of H is therefore reformulated in terms of this response, as follows: 
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Taking the derivative of equation (5) with respect to t, we obtain the 
first-order condition as follows: 
 
1 − 2𝛽𝛽 + 𝑡𝑡𝛽𝛽
���3 − 𝑡𝑡�𝑡𝑡 − ��
�1 − 𝑡𝑡�� = 0. 
 
(6) 
Implicitly differentiating equation (6) and solving for dt/dβ yields 
 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑𝛽𝛽 = −
�2 + 𝑡𝑡�𝛽𝛽�
�1 − 𝑡𝑡���1 + 𝛽𝛽� < 0. 
 
(7) 
Parametric restrictions prescribed above warrant the strict inequality 
expressed by equation (7). To summarize: 
PROPOSITION: Given the cost structure 0 < β, the bargaining power 
choice by headquarters H responds negatively to the importance of business 
unit U represented by β. 
 
The intuition behind this proposition is that as the importance of the 
operations conducted by U rises, H gradually cedes its bargaining power to 
motivate U to invest. By obtaining the bargaining power, U not only 
increases its investment but also attains a larger profit πU. Importantly, a 
larger πU in turn increases the transfer of revenue to H and makes the total 
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PROPOSITION: Given	the	cost	structure	0	<	β,	the	bargaining	power	
choice by headquarters H responds negatively to the importance of business 
unit	U	represented	by	β.
The intuition behind this proposition is that as the importance of the 
operations conducted by U rises, H gradually cedes its bargaining power 
to motivate U to invest. By obtaining the bargaining power, U not only 
increases its investment but also attains a larger profit πU. Importantly, 
a larger πU in turn increases the transfer of revenue to H and makes the 
total profit of the company π higher than that achieved when there is no 
bargaining game. Consequently, H is sufficiently compensated for the loss 
incurred by abandoning its bargaining power.
Next, following the research on incomplete contracts, we examine 
the case in which the outcome of U’s operation is distributed based on 
the Nash bargaining solution. Assuming that U’s outcome is distributed 
corresponding to equivalent bargaining powers (i.e., t = 1/2), we can rewrite 
U’s profit as follows:
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because the corresponding reduction in t provides U with greater incentive to 
invest in its current operations. 
 
NUMERICAL EXAMPLE 
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2 In this case, the level of β must be smaller than one for the production volume to remain positive. On 
the other hand, in the model we provided first, β can take any nonnegative value. 
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2 In this case, the level of β must be smaller than one for the production volume to remain positive. On 
the other hand, in the model we provided first, β can take any nonnegative value. 
  Figure 1: Relationship between πH     Figure 2: Relationship between 
 and t for a given β πH and πU
We provide a numerical example to better understand the relationship 
between πH and parameters t and β. Figure 1 illustrates the case of β taking 
values of (a) 0.4, (b) 1, and (c) 4. Compared with the case of (a), H facing 
a higher β (i.e., (b) and (c)) realizes greater profits by ceding bargaining 
power due to the increased revenue, effectively recovering the loss from 
diluted bargaining power. In short, as confirmed in the previous section, 
the greater the importance of U’s business, the larger portion of bargaining 
power would be willingly abandoned by H.
We gain additional insight from Figure 2. Three convex graphs describe 
U’s	profit at each β. Observe that  is strictly positive at H’s optimal points. 
In other words, as a result of H’s profit maximization, U also gains profit.
DISCUSSION
This paper contributes to the literature because it explicitly addresses 
the optimal share of bargaining power between players by recognizing 
endogenous choice of it. In doing so, we explain the theoretical reason why 
a business unit gradually grow into an independent company. In addition 
to this, because the degree of a business unit’s independence affects the 
structure of the management control system established by headquarters, 
our finding also contributes to the literature of management accounting.
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Our findings have implication for empirical research concerning the 
antecedents of spin-offs. Prior literature of this field has clarified various 
antecedents (Iturriaga & Cruz 2008, Panela et al., 2019). This paper provided 
an attractive potential factor that should be examined.
CONCLUSION
We analyzed the choice of bargaining power from the perspective of 
the relationship between headquarters and business units. We find that 
the bargaining power choice by headquarters is negatively related to the 
importance of the operations of the business unit. This result has been 
confirmed by numerical examples. Our findings can be an explanation of 
why a business unit gradually acquires more independence from its parent 
company.
On the other hand, our study operationalizes bargaining power as a 
variable that is exclusively determined by headquarters. However, if we 
consider the possibility that an independent company chooses to become 
affiliated with other company through M&A, our assumption provides only 
an incomplete assessment on the bargaining power choice between players. 
In future research, we can assume a situation in which all of the participants 
in the contract can influence the degree of bargaining power.
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